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LOVE IN THE AGE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY:





The tremendous advances in science and technology today
need not deter us in promoting and sustaining love. This may seem
surprising to some, at least because such advances have resulted in
pessimism concerning the survival of love. On the contrary, not only
is love possible, but it has become more necessary in today’s world.
The paper will focus on the kind of love that Buddhism pays particular
attention to, namely metta (Skrt. maitri) and karuna.  The two terms
are generally translated as ‘loving-kindness’ and ‘compassion’
respectively. It is the teleological character of Buddhist thought that
makes metta and karuna possible in today’s world.
I.  Introduction
The fact that today’s world is so thoroughly pervaded by technology
scarcely needs comment. By ‘technology’ here I do not mean merely the
kind of technology that has existed since there were human civilizations,
such as the plough or the water mill. The technology that concerns me in
this paper is much more powerful, and has the potential to transform not
only our ways of living and conceptualizing the world, but they have the
potential power to transform the constitution of our very being. One is
well aware now that the first steps toward cloning of full human beings are
now a reality. Genetic manipulation of living organisms is growing rapidly,
prompting concerns over the use of such technology in ways that exacerbate
existing inequalities and perhaps create irreversible changes to the
environment. On the other hand, information technology is poised to
transform human beings and societies just as dramatically. The Internet,
many believe, has the potential to transform the ways people think and
what they believe. Some have even gone so far as saying that it is an
instrument of ‘colonizing consciousness’.1 People all over the world are
communicating with cellular phones and computers, but it seems that the
more cellular phones and computer networks are used in communication,
the more isolated people become from one another. These two major
strands of contemporary technology are also merging together,2 thus making
each strand much more powerful than it can be alone. On top of this, the
manipulation of matter has progressed to such a level that the individual
molecules themselves being arranged and rearranged according to the
manipulator’s desires. The implications of this nanotechnology could well
be very serious.
In this paper I would like to reflect upon these phenomena in
order to find tentative answers to the question: How love is possible at all
in such an age? I believe this question has become all the more pertinent
because biotechnology, information technology and nanotechnology, each
in its own way but in a structurally rather similar manner, have the power
to transform human society and relationships in such a way that love could
become extinct altogether. This is so because, as the technologies advance,
there is a real possibility that traditional ways of living and ways of relating
to one another will be severely threatened, and this of course includes
love.
I have to mention at the outset that ‘love’ in this paper does not
mean merely erotic love or romantic relationships. While the subject of
romantic love’s relation with technology is interesting and itself deserves a
treatment in a series of papers, what I feel to be a more urgent topic is
love in the broader sense of agape, or, as Spinoza says, amor intellectualis
Dei, or metta and karuna in the Theravada Buddhist tradition. That is, I
would like to focus on love as an unconditional devotional attitude toward
the Supreme Being (in the theistic religions) or unconditional well wishing
of other sentient beings (in the case of Buddhism). While there are important
similarities and differences among agape, amor intellectualis Dei, metta
and karuna, I will focus on the latter two in this paper. These two Pali
terms are translated as ‘loving-kindness’ and ‘compassion’ respectively.
I will mention only briefly how the Buddhist and the Western concepts are
similar or different from each other, and concentrate the bulk of the paper
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on the question how I feel metta and karuna seem to be threatened in
this age of high technology and what we can do about it.
In the next section I will discuss some key texts surrounding these
two terms. Then, in Section III, I present my tentative answer to the
question in the title. The idea is that metta and karuna must be possible—
that much can be taken for granted, and the more important question is
how. And key to an answer to that lies in the role of mental and character
development, which plays a crucial role in Buddhist ethics. Another key is
the emphasis on the teleological  nature of Theravada Buddhist thought,
where everything is geared toward attainment of nibbana. In the age of
high technology, metta and karuna are possible through education,
practice and transformation of the consciousness of the people. This implies
also that the kind of technological enterprise being conducted currently
mostly in the West but is spreading fast elsewhere needs to be reconsidered.
Then Section IV concludes the paper.
II.  Metta and Karuna
According to the Theravada tradition, metta and karuna are two
of the four ‘Abodes of the Brahma’ (Brahmavihara’s) that characterize
the mental attitude of one who practices the path of purification leading
ultimately to nibbana. The other two are mudita and upekkha. Metta
means ‘wish for all beings to become happy’; karuna means ‘wish for all
beings to cease from suffering’; mudita is ‘to feel happy when the others
are happy, and finally upekkha is the feeling of equanimity or non-
attachment toward worldly happenings. These are important attitudes to
cultivate for those who would like to enter the path toward Liberation.
That love (or loving-kindness) and compassion are very important in
Buddhism is underscored by Richard Gombrich, according to whom it
was out of these two sentiments that Buddhism itself first originated.3
Furthermore, the Karaniya-metta Sutta, a popular paritta chant
in the Khuddaka-patha, has the following to say about the benefits of
metta:
He who is skilled in good, and who wishes to attain that State of
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Peace [i.e., nibbana] should act thus: he should be able, upright, perfectly
upright, of pleasant speech, gentle and humble, contented, easy to
support, unbusy, with sense controlled, discreet, modest, not greedily
attached to families. He should not commit any slight wrong on account
of which other wise men might censure him. ‘May all beings be happy
and secure, may they be happy-minded! Whatever living beings there
are—feeble or strong, long, stout or medium, short, small or large, seen or
unseen, those dwelling far or near, those who are born or those who await
rebirth—may all beings, without exception, be happy-minded! Let none
deceive another nor despise any person whatever in any place; in anger
or ill-will let them not wish any suffering to each other. Just as a mother
would protect her child at the risk of her own life, even so, let him cultivate
a boundless heart toward all beings. Let his thoughts of boundless loving
kindness pervade the whole world: above, below and across, without
obstruction, without any hatred, without any enmity. Whether he stands,
walks, sits or lies down, as long as he is awake, he should develop this
mindfulness. This, they say, is divine abiding here. Not falling into wrong
views, virtuous and endowed with insight, he gives up attachment for
sense-desires. He will surely not come again to any womb.4
In Buddhadhamma, which is arguably Thailand’s most outstanding
contribution to Buddhist scholarship in modern times, Venerable Payutto
has the following to say about metta, which is reminiscent of the Western
conception of eros and agape:
Metta is a well known topic of Dharma. However, there may be some
problems understanding it. The usual translation of ‘metta’ is love, having
good wishes toward others, wishing others to be happy and to find only
good and beneficial things. This translation sounds easy enough to
understand. But problems arise when one confuses this meaning with
love that is metta and love that is unwholesome. Love that is unwholesome
is often referred to as ‘sineha,’ which means love or infatuation only to
certain individuals.... This kind of love only results in the mind becoming
narrowed down and clouded, or heated and excited. On the contrary,
metta is pure love that one has toward one’s earthly friends and sentient
beings, who are all friends that suffer together under the samsara.... This
results in the mind becoming wide open and clarified.5
This wide open and clarified characteristic of the mind, which is
cultivated through practicing metta and actually the other three elements
of the Brahmavihara’s is key toward the realization of nibbana later on.
Payutto places much emphasis on metta, which is directed at all beings
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without exception, as opposed to the particular nature of sineha, or love
informed by egoistic desire, which is only directed at particular individuals
or objects. The key here is the role of the ego. Since cultivating metta is
among the first steps toward the realization of the truth that the ego is only
a construction and is not there substantially in reality, whereas cultivating
sineha brings about the exact opposite, the two are thus natural opposing
members of each other, and one should remind oneself how the two are
thus opposed so that one remains steadfast and becomes clear what metta
actually is.
The key in all this is that the practice of Brahmavihara’s serves
to rid oneself of the defilements that block the path toward nibbana. With
the attitudes of loving-kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy and
equanimity, one purifies the mind, with the result that not only does the
individual self become purified, but the world will become literally a better
place. The canonical texts may present the Brahmavihara’s as techniques
for stilling the mind, thus helping an individual to practice it gain insights
that lead to his or her own attainment. However, that is not to say that
Buddhism pays attention only to individual well being and not to the well
being of the society as a whole. On the contrary, the emphasis is on the
development of mental character in such a way that the mind is thoroughly
pervaded by these four attitudes, and it is easy to imagine that most of the
ills in the world, at least all ills that are caused by malevolence or harmful
intentions, will be eliminated if everybody has a loving-kindness and
compassionate attitude toward one another. It is true that each individual
needs to practice the Brahmavihara’s for his or her own individual
benefit—that is a basic tenet of Theravada Buddhism, but that does not
mean that social concern should altogether be neglected. The idea is that
changes at the social level come from the volition and intention at the
individual level.
In terms of individual ethics, then, what is ‘right’ is constituted by
an individual’s practice, that leads to the dissolution of the wrongful views
connected with the ego, and which leads finally to attainment of nibbana.
One can cultivate that kind of practice through the practice of the
Brahmavihara’s. In terms of social philosophy then, a ‘right social practice’
is constituted by the ability of individuals in that society to practice and
develop their inner capacities so that they can attain nibbana in the end.
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Thus Sue Hamilton is correct when she writes that “love, or compassion,
is inseparable from the efficacy of one’s action.”6 Accepting personal
responsibility, in her view, involves that one needs to help oneself, and
acts of love and compassion should always include the aim of helping one
to be able to help oneself.7 Such practice and development does not limit
themselves only to individual practice of meditation, but also include social
action such as charity work and, I may add, destruction of unjust social
structure. In short, love as metta and karuna (and also mudita and
upekkha) is not only an instrument for individual benefits alone, but through
that individual benefit one gains a kind of society and community that best
exemplifies the ideals of justice and benevolence, an ideal society or
community.
There is also a tendency among some scholars to pronounce a
distinction between ‘kammic’ and ‘nibbanic’ Buddhism. According to
Melford Spiro8 and Winston King,9 ‘kammic’ Buddhism is associated
with the lay followers and involve such things as making merits in order to
attain better next lives. The emphasis is on performing action in order to
reap the rewards in the future. On the other hand, ‘nibbanic’ Buddhism
focuses exclusively on the cessation of suffering and involves practices
such as meditation and intellectual studies of the canonical texts. This brand
of Buddhism is found more in the monasteries than in the lay households.
Furthermore, Spiro and King view this latter to be the correct practice of
Buddhism.
However, according to Harvey Aronson10 such a distinction is
mistaken.11 One can bring about nibbana also through the development of
what is understood as ‘kammic’ Buddhism. Through the ‘kammic’ practice
of developing the four Brahmavihara’s, the Theravada text also states
that one is equally able to attain nibbana. Through the meditation on loving-
kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity, one thereby gains
admission to the high heaven, the abode of Brahma. That is, by itself,
within the realm of kammic Buddhism. However, Aronson states that there
are many references in the texts that show that this practice of loving-
kindness and so on enables one to gain a penetrating insight into the nature
of all beings, which brings about attainment of nibbana.12
This is relevant in our case because if metta and karuna,  are
efficacious in bringing about the supreme goal of Buddhism, then they,
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together with the other two elements of the Brahmavihara’s, are endorsed
at the highest level of Buddhism itself. In fact the so-called ‘kammic’ and
‘nibbanic’ Buddhisms are not really separable from each other. One starts
one’s practice toward the ultimate goal of nibbana through the development
of one’s own physical, vocal and mental characters. One continually refines
one’s bodily action, speech and mental thoughts, until one finally achieves
the ultimate goal. These practices of following the Brahmavihara’s inevitably
bring about positive karmic results—this much is in accordance with Spiro’s
‘kammic’ Buddhism. However, the texts are unequivocal in guaranteeing
that this type of practice leads one quite directly to the ultimate goal, which
is the domain of ‘nibbanic’ Buddhism. And since the practice of the
Brahmavihara’s are inseparable from right social action in order to found
right social structuring, then it can be quite plausibly argued that, contrary
to popular belief, social concern is built into the highest teaching of Buddhism
itself.
III.  How are Metta and Karuna Possible in a Technological Society?
On St. Valentine’s Day this year, it was reported that as many as
17 million “I love you” messages were sent in Thailand through the short
message service systems on mobile phones. Many altruistic activities are
organized through the use of information technology, and many websites
have sprung up focusing on disseminating the Buddhist teachings, with the
explicit aim of fostering loving-kindness and compassion. These examples
seem to show that metta and karuna are alive and well with technology,
as the latter is used to serve the purpose of propagating the former.
Furthermore, they also seem to support the position of technological
neutralism or instrumentalism, where technology is perceived to be a neutral
force lacking its own ethical and evaluative character. The influx of
information technology apparently, according to the above examples, did
not obviate the Thai people’s strong attachment to metta and karuna.
On the contrary, novel ways to utilize the technology are being devised,
apparently to follow the key Buddhist teaching of engendering loving-
kindness and compassion. The saying is that it is not the technology that is
the culprit, but the people who use it—”Guns do not kill people, people
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do,” so the saying goes. However, this idea is deeply problematic because
technology allows for possibilities which hitherto have not been there before,
and it is these possibilities that open up ways of performing action that
could have been prevented or could not have been conceived before if
there had not been the technology in the first place. In the case of guns,
many actual killings could have been prevented only through keeping guns
out of people’s hands. In the case of information technology, instrumentalism
seems to be saying that all the ills that are accorded to the technology,
such as the proliferation of pornographic material and its perceived threat
toward the minds of children and youths, are rooted in the volition of
those who propagate the websites, and the technology itself is not
responsible.
On the other hand, attempts to promote the use of information
technology, such as the attempts of the Thai government to connect each
and every village in the country through communication networks, seem
to be based more on the belief that it is the technology itself that is efficacious
in bringing about desired changes in these villages. To the Thai government,
the problem of rural development appears to be simple: Give the villagers
computers, software and infrastructure, then development will happen. I
have presented my opinion in another paper that this is far from being the
case.13 The policy makers responsible for the Thai government’s approach
appear to be under the spell of technological determinism, the belief that
the path of technologization is an inevitable one. And what is more startling
is that this belies the belief that there is only one such path that societies in
the Third World need to take in order to ‘catch up’ with the West.14
It seems to me, however, that both technological neutralism and
determinism are in the wrong, and perhaps they are but two opposing
sides of the same coin. Thus I am in a broad agreement with Charles Ess,
who argues essentially the same thing.15 Both neutralism and determinism
seem to be based on the presupposition that technology and its surrounding
contexts are distinct. For neutralism or instrumentalism, technology is
perceived as a neutral force. In this case it is clear that the two are perceived
to be entirely distinct from each other. On the other hand, the idea of
determinism, that technology is an autonomous force which cannot be
channelled or controlled, also presupposes that technology can stand aloof
from its contextual domain. Many works in science and technology studies,
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however, have contradicted this assumption of distinctness of technology
from its social, cultural and historical contexts.16 The details are too
numerous to list here. Nonetheless, the main idea is not too difficult to
grasp. Technology, and I emphasize here the ‘high’ technology of our
contemporary era, cannot be conceived apart from its socio-historical
context. What I mean that technologies such as nanotechnology or
biotechnology are part and parcel of our contemporary, late capitalist,
early twenty-first century societies, so much so that it is not conceivable to
imagine another possible society, where these kinds of technology flourish
in a very different social and cultural environment. This is so because all
technologies arise from human needs and wants.
Information technology, for example, first arose out of the need
for the military to find a machine that could perform calculations powerful
enough to crack the secret codes of the enemy. The Internet, furthermore,
also has its origin in the military, as is well known. We can conceive of a
different kind of social environment where there is no need for the military
to devise such a scheme, or where there is no need for the military to
innovate at all. An example would be the case of Ming China, where the
major policy was mainly to withdraw oneself and to build protective shells
as a response to external threats, the Ming emperors ordered the Great
Wall to be built, which still stands today, and they ordered their Chinese
subjects to stay away from the coast in order to avoid the threats of Japanese
pirates. There are of course many factors involved, but it seems clear at
any rate that if technologies are humans’ answers to the challenges that
they face, then in the environments where the threats are different, then the
technologies can be entirely different. We can even imagine life on an alien
planet as having developing a completely different technology based upon
the particulars of its alien environments and cultures.
Of course it can also be imagined that in a different environment,
a similar kind of technology can well emerge that resembles what we have
today. The fact that technologies such as nanotechnology could not have
arisen in 15th century Ming China does not entail that no such technology
can ever take place in another, different environment. It seems plausible,
so the argument goes, that technologies can converge. Different
environments can produce same kinds of technology. Suppose in a different
planet something like the Internet. Let’s call it ‘Shaman-Net’ was not born
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with the military, but was invented as a tool for priests and shamans to
store and categorize information and to allow them to communicate with
their peers. Then it can be easily imagined further how that technology
could be much similar to what we have today. But this argument looks
really too simple. What does it actually take for priests and shamans in
that context to communicate with their peers and to categorize and store
information? What kind of equipment is used? What kind of attitude toward
the network that the priests have which presumably do not resemble our
own (remember that the Internet was once associated with the ‘tech culture’
and libertarianism here.) To what kind of society and culture do the priests
and shamans belong? If the example provides more details then in order
to make the Shaman-Net more like our own, the kind of social and cultural
environment perhaps needs to be more like our own too.
This serves to show how technology is inextricably linked up with
socio-historical contexts. But if this is so, then the presupposition of both
neutralism and determinism does not seem to hold, with the result that
both positions are not actually tenable.17 Technology is not a neutral power,
depending solely on human volition and motivation; but neither is it an
autonomous force capable of its own internal movement and logic.
Information technology, for example, is only capable of transforming belief
and consciousness because certain socio-cultural contexts do obtain.
Without those contexts, there would be no such power of transformation.
Among the Buddhist arahants, who have already attained nibbana and
are totally free from kilesas or defilements, information technology has no
power over them at all. Furthermore, in a kind of social condition where
the people are educated well enough to become immune to these negative
influences, the power does not take hold either, as can be seen when
many cultures find creative and novel ways of using the Internet to serve
their own agenda, which are internal to their own values and goals.
On the other hand, new kind of technology often produces a series
of changes in the socio-cultural contexts where it is introduced. Today it
seems every teenager in Thailand is toting a mobile phone. It is a very
fashionable item. Changes, some of which are rather profound, are taking
place each minute, and it seems undeniable that these changes are caused
by the introduction of the technology. However, this does not mean that
the path of development of a society can be totally determined by
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technology. As societies are changing as a result of introduction of various
types of technology, it remains within the power of the individuals or in the
collective judgment and decision of the society as a whole to put the forces
of technology under control. Since technology is inseparable from context,
the two do influence each other. Humans control technology through
volition, and societies are in turned influenced by technology through the
latter’s being an important part in the logic of capitalism and world order,
as well as its internal characteristics.
What is pertinent in our case here is that, in this very own context
of early twenty-first century earth, how are metta and karuna possible?
If technology is inextricably bound up with socio-cultural contexts, then
metta and karuna, in short, are not possible without changes in these
contexts, or at least without some corresponding conditions being possible
in the contexts themselves. The trick is to find what features in the contexts
should be responsible for them to be viable. Since metta and karuna,
wish for other beings to be happy and to cease from suffering, are
fundamental to human relationships and their care toward one another,
they are thus possible to the extent that the contemporary technological
society does foster that kind of caring relationships. That fostering would
not be possible if the structure, the way society is constituted, did not
allow that to happen. In a kind of technological society where inequalities
are ingrained, where there is exploitation of the poor by the rich and
powerful, marginalized is rampant. And where the technology is only used
to benefit those who are in power, this widens the gap even further. The
growing concern over the digital divide issue, both between groups of
nations, and within nation states themselves, clearly attests to this problem.
Without concerned effort and concrete measures of all those involved, it
appears that love as metta and karuna would be doomed.
Though the political and economic structure of society is vitally
important in bringing about love and caring relationships, according to the
Buddhist thought it is not sufficient. What more is needed is the kind of
mental and character development which fosters loving-kindness and caring
attitudes that will make metta and karuna lasting concrete realities. In IT
under the Culture of Wisdom,18 Ven. Payutto writes that the typical
Buddhist attitude toward such things as information technology is that the
latter should not be allowed to take hold of the awareness and imagination
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of the people in such a way that they lose sight of what really matters to
them, namely their attempt to get rid of dukkha and attain nibbana, or at
least starting to practice in the right direction in order that suffering is
eliminated in the end. Payutto also stresses that education and character
development should play a central role in any attempt to harness the power
of technology to benefit humankind to the fullest:
All this means that, if used in the wrong way, technology is
poisonous. In the West they are paying a lot of attention on violence,
which is very harmful indeed, as well as advertising, which is a kind of
baiting for those who are gullible. Our Thai society is also facing the
same problems, including indulgence in the power and material benefits
of technology, dependence on it, and indolence. In short, if people do not
know how to use the technology, then there are problems, including
deterioration of physical and mental health and worsening relations
among the people in the world, such as competition and lack of warmth in
the family.... As for the intellect, the flood of information has no benefits.
It only increases delusion (moha). We need to find a solution for all this.
....
I would like to emphasize that what is needed in coping with
information is education.... We need to develop people so as they are
above technology. No matter how far the technology has progressed,
people need to be developed to be above it. Do not let people become
slaves of the technology. If technology is above people, then there are
dangers. But if people are above technology then there is a way out to
safety, because people would then be able to protect their freedom.19
The idea is that technology needs to remain under control of people
who are wise enough to see through it and who remain free despite its
powers.
This emphasis on character development needs not conflict with
the influx and diffusion of high technology, as we have seen. Since neither
technological instrumentalism and determinism is tenable, social context
and technology in fact determine one another in a dynamic relationship.
This means that character development should be part of society’s response
to the influx of high technology, and the two can go along with each other.
Moreover, since the influx of technology means that at least some
characteristics of the social environment will change to a certain degree,
what we also need is then a kind of technology that allows for loving-
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kindness and compassion to be possible. Hence, the kind of technology
that is predicated upon exploitation of the poor and on widening the gap
between the richer and poorer nations of the world would not contribute
to promoting metta and karuna. These technologies include those pushed
forward by multinational corporations that focus exclusively on their own
profits rather than on contributing to bridging the gap. Microsoft’s practice
of effectively monopolizing operating system software, which lies at the
core of almost all the machines embodying the information technology we
have today, and Monsanto’s technology of producing seeds that prevent
farmers from replanting them after harvest would be two clear examples
of the technologies that worsen the existing inequalities. They are, in short,
examples of technologies that lack metta and karuna.
IV.  Conclusion
Perhaps we can start imagining what it would be like for high
technology to incorporate metta and karuna by imagining first what kind
of socio-cultural environment it would be like for the technology to co-
exist with or even to be supportive of the two. It has often been said, in
Buddhist Thailand and elsewhere, that to attain the arahant or nibbanic
ideal is a very difficult task that few could achieve, thus it seems a utopian
dream to imagine that such a society that realizes the ideal could ever be
achieved in reality. However, to think in such a way is to follow the lines of
those who propound that nibbana is a remote and almost impossible
goal, and the task of human beings should focus more on performing ethical
conduct and on collecting merits for the next lives, without having to bother
to think about the Ultimate Goal. This kind of attitude goes against the
very core of Buddhism itself. For without the realizable and imminent
nibbana there is no real impetus toward the dissolution of the ego which
is necessary for conducts to be genuinely ethical and to be efficacious to
bringing about a kind of society in which the ideals are concrete reality.
Since nibbana is imminent, a kind of society envisioned here is not a
fantastic dream. And the Buddha has shown clearly how that is to be
achieved. The first steps involve cultivating metta, karuna and the other
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Brahmavihara’s. Needless to say, here the role of education and character
development is crucial.
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